International commodity agreements which aim for price and revenue stabilization are a major policy issue at meetings of UNCTAD. Especially during the last conferences the main if not only objective formulated in the agreements has been price stabilization around a long-term trend (see eg UNCTAD [22] ). The desirability of price stabilization has been an important theoretical issue in the economic literature for a long time, Turnovsky [21] surveys and extends the Waugh Oi-Massell analysis. Prices are random because of stochastic fluctuations in demand and supply. The criteria for judging the desirability of price stabilization are the expected producers' surplus and approach. The second is a price adjustment rule which means that the stabilizing agency is constantly trying to keep the price as close as possible to an a priori specified target price path. This is the sort of rule that also results from an optimal control approach to the stabilization problem.
Lee and Blandford [16] use empirical models for the world cocoa and copper markets and perform an optimal control analysis for price and revenue stabilization. They stress the need to take account of the systematic trend of the price in setting the target price path because otherwise the attempts to stabilize are doomed to fail. Their conclusion is that it is likely to require substantial market intervention to produce a significant reduction in price instability, although price stability can have a favourable impact on the level and stability of producers' revenues. Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hallett [10] construct a model of the world copper market in which the market clearing identity is replaced with an explicit price formation mechanism. They compare band width rules with optimal control results and conclude that band width rules are no match for optimal stabilization schemes. Hughes Hallett [13] explores the problem further. The conclusion is again that significant stabilization of the copper market is possible but very expensive. However, in contrast with Lee and Blandford [16] there is now no improvement in the level of producers' earnings, although the variability can be reduced substantially. This is in line with the theoretical results that are reported in Turnovsky [21] .
Turnovsky [21] and Newbery and Stiglitz [17] raise the question of what the impact of the actions of the stabilizing authority on private speculative storage might be and whether the actions of private speculators might jeopardize the desired outcome. Lee and Blandford [ 16] and Hughes Hallett [ 13] also emphasize the assumption in their exercise that the behaviour of market participants is unaffected by buffer stock stabilization. The Lucas critique argues that this assumption is not realistic and might lead to the wrong policy advice. This paper therefore suggests using a difference game approach instead of an optimal control approach. In this way it is possible to study what happens when producers and consumers can also employ storage activities in reaction to buffer stock activities and when the buffer stock manager realizes this. It must be stressed that the Lucas critique is not completely resolved in this way because other behaviour is kept fixed in the model. The storage behaviour of the buffer stock manager, producers and consumers is modelled as an optimal control problem and the strategic interaction is modelled as a game. It is suggested that the feedback Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium concept should be employed in this difference game. An algorithm which leads to this equilibrium is given by de Zeeuw [24] . In this paper an empirical model for the world cocoa market is used which is based on a model developed in van Groenendaal and Vingerhoets [ 12] . This model consists of estimated equations for production and consumption and for several price indices.
The optimal stabilization policy of the buffer stock manager based on an optimal control approach is compared with the Nash equilibrium between buffer stock manager, producing countries and consuming countries. The idea is that a country modelled as a strategic agent represents all strategic activities within that country. In this Nash equilibrium the producing countries aim for higher export prices and the consuming countries aim for lower import prices. In the attempt to stabilize the world market price the buffer stock manager is restricted by the available buffer stock, which can never become negative. In their attempt to get a better export price or import price the countries are restricted in their storage decisions by assumptions about the reasonable size of the stock. The conclusions are that both producing countries and consuming countries engage in storage activities which counteract the stabilizing efforts of the buffer stock manager, although this effect is small. The buffer stock can be successful in stabilizing world market prices and revenues but there remains a conflict on the market which calls for further coordination. It is interesting that the operating costs of the buffer stock decrease in the game setting. In addition, when producing countries and consuming countries are both active, producers are worse off whereas consumers are better off.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an empirical model for the world cocoa market. The following section gives algorithms for the optimal control solution and the feedback Nash behavioural equilibrium in a linear quadratic framework. The price stabilization problem is then formulated in the next section as an optimal control problem, when there is no speculation, and as a Nash difference game, when there is speculation. The algorithms given in the previous section are applied to the cocoa model presented earlier and the results for the optimal control formulation and the Nash difference game formulation are compared. The last section offers conclusions.
Cocoa model
Cocoa beans are produced in underdeveloped and less developed countries and cocoa products are mainly consumed in developed countries. This implies that the trade between producers and consumers is typically Table 2 gives the estimation results. The producer prices, PFI, are expressed in home currency and the export prices, PE, in US dollars. Because of government policy and quality differences these prices are not simply related through the exchange rates, RE. For the same reason export prices, PE, and import prices, PI, are not equal to the world market price, PICCO. For all these price equations an autoregressive distributed lag model of the first order was introduced. The resulting specifications are
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Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the estimation results.
The world market cocoa price, PICCO, depends on the difference between world supply and demand. Buffer stock operations, ABST, have a direct influence on this difference. Supply, ERWT, sums up the production per country or region minus a change, AST, in stocks, which are held for strategic reasons in that country or region. Demand, IRWT, sums up the demand for grindings per region plus the imports of cocoa bean equivalents plus a strategically held change, AST, in stocks. Apart from stocks held for strategic reasons it is also assumed that the consuming regions keep a fraction of the demand for grindings in stock for production of cocoa products. This desired level of stocks is set equal to the average level of stocks over the period 1968 80 (0.225 x IRWT). The definitional equation for total demand, IRWT, also includes an autonomous component, CCRR, to account for imports in countries or regions, which are not modelled explicitly. Differences in world supply and demand will also create changes, ASTWT, in free stocks of cocoa bean equivalents (the factor 0.99 accounts for transport losses). These free stocks will influence the world market price in so far as they differ from the desired level of stocks. Changing demand will induce a change in the desired level of stocks (0.225 x AIRWT). This will lead to a change in the demand for stocks and therefore this term is added to demand, IRWT, in the specification for the world market cocoa price. Since markets are not independent the commodity price index, CPI, is included in the specification in order to separate the effect of differences in supply and demand on the cocoa market from the spill over effects from other markets. Indicators for the instability of monetary variables did not have any significant influence. The relevant definitional equations and the resulting specification for the world market cocoa price are as follows.
World supply 8 Table 6 gives the estimation results. 
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In the next section control and game algorithms are given for the abstract model, ( 10)- ( 11 ) . In the section after these algorithms are applied to the underlying world cocoa model, (1)-(9).
Difference game methodology
The objective of the buffer stock manager is to keep the world market price as close as possible to an a priori specified target price path by selling and buying on the world market. Therefore the basic part of the objective functional of the buffer stock manager consists of squared deviations of the world market price path, PICCO, from this target price path, PICCO. The interventions of the buffer stock manager are restricted by the available buffer stock and/or the available budget. An optimal degree of price stabilization can be found by using as objective functional the weighted sum of squares over a fixed planning horizon
t=l A high value for the relative priority q/r will generally lead to a good stabilization result with strong interventions, whereas a low value for q/r will generally lead to a bad stabilization result with minor interventions. Given the restrictions on interventions there will generally be a best stabilization result corresponding with an optimal value for the relative priority q/r. The objective functionals of the other market participants are formulated in the same way, with the world market price replaced by the export price for the producing countries or regions and by the import price for the consuming regions. These objective functionals reflect the idea that, although producing and consuming countries and regions participate in the buffer stock in order to stabilize prices, there may be additional storage activities in these countries and regions in order to try to get higher export prices or lower import prices. This leads to a strategic interaction between buffer stock manager, producers and consumers, which can be modelled as a difference game. In terms of the state space form, (10) (13) and the constraints (10) ( 11 ), where .9 ~ are the vectors of target price paths and where the diagonal matrices Q" are semipositive definite and the scalars R: are positive. The quadratic form of the objective functionals implies that deviations above and below the target paths are equally punished. This is a suitable type of criterion for stabilization purposes. However, in this game it is not the objective of producers and consumers to stabilize prices, but to get higher export prices or lower import prices. A way out is to set the target path of export (import) prices high (low) enough for the resulting price path to remain below (above) the target price path. The precise choice of the target paths as well as the relative priorities q/r must again be motivated by the desirability and the feasibility of the outcomes (see also the next section). Suppose the buffer stock manager is labelled as player l, the producing countries or regions are The behaviourai equilibrium concept used to solve the difference game is the non-cooperative Nash concept. It is important to distinguish between the Nash solution with only initial state information and with binding commitments and the Nash solution with current state information and without binding commitments (Basar and Olsder [3] , de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg [25] ). The first is called the open loop Nash solution and the second is called the feedback Nash or subgame perfect solution. Since it seems more realistic to assume the use of current state information and no binding commitments, the feedback Nash solution is employed here. This behavioural equilibrium is found by solving static Nash games in a dynamic programming framework. The equilibrium strategies are given by de Zeeuw [24] :
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The variable x in the strategy representations (14) denotes the state information at time t. In a simulation it is assumed that the players observe the simulated state vector.
Cocoa market as a game
In this section two strategic interventions on the international cocoa market are compared. In the first a buffer stock manager tries to stabilize the world market price by selling and buying on the world market from an available buffer stock. In the second producers and consumers take account of these buffer stock activities and consider intervening for themselves in order to obtain higher export prices or lower import prices. The buffer stock manager realizes this so the three market participants play a Nash game between them. In the first exercise the buffer stock manager employs the optimal control strategy u 1 given by Equations (14)- (19) with Qi =0, i= 2 ..... 13. In the second exercise the players employ the set of Nash strategies u i, i= 1 ..... 13, also given by Equations (14) (19) . Both control and Nash game algorithms start from the model parameters (A,, B,, z,), the initial state vector xl, the target paths )Y and the relative priorities (Qi, Ri). The target path for the world market price should reflect the idea that the buffer stock manager only tries to counter undesirable market forces on the international cocoa market and not the spill over effects from other markets. This target path is therefore constructed as follows (see for other ideas for the construction of target price paths Lee and Blandford [16] ; Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hailett [10] ; Hughes Hallett [13] ). First, the world market price, PICCO, is simulated with the cocoa model given above and a trend is determined. Second, the world market price, PICCO, is simulated with Equation (9) in which ~2 and :~3 are set equal to zero, which implies market equilibrium, and again a trend is determined. Finally, the deviations from trend in the second simulation are added to the trend found in the first simulation. The resulting price path is taken as the target path for the world market cocoa price. It seems logical to use this target path and Equations (4) and (5) to construct target paths for export and import prices. However, this would typically lead to additional stabilization efforts and not to the sort of conflict that we are attempting to analyse here. In that conflict producers and consumers are trying to get higher export prices and lower import prices respectively and not stable prices. They aim at a better result than they would get by doing nothing. The construction of these target paths is therefore based on the resulting price 
The first term is the total yearly outward cash flow from selling and buying. The second term represents the costs for restoring the buffer stock at its initial level. The warehouse costs of the buffer stock are not taken into account.
paths from the control experiment. The target paths for export prices are set 10% higher than the result of the control experiment and the target paths for import prices are set 10% lower.
The control experiment is set up as follows. The buffer stock manager is given an initial buffer stock of 100000 metric tons. The relative priority Q~l/R 1 is determined by experiment. The value of R 1 is arbitrarily set at 10. Starting at 0 the value of QI~ is gradually increased until the accumulated buffer stock changes just hit the ceiling of 100000 metric tons somewhere in the sampling period, which happens for Qlll = 30. This is the best stabilization result the buffer stock manager can achieve with the available buffer stock. The results are presented in Table 7 .
The game experiment is essentially set up in the same way. The values of R ~, i= 2 ..... 13, are also arbitrarily set at 10. The values of Qi i, i = 2 ..... 13, are also gradually increased starting at 0 until the accumulated interventions on the producers' side and the consumers' side unrealistically exceed a preset value of about 140000 metric tons. From the experiments it is found that an increasing Qii, which must lead to higher export prices and lower import prices respectively, also leads to more income for the producing countries and regions and lower costs for the consuming regions. This implies that prices are a good indicator of revenues and costs so that the experiment was set up realistically in that respect in the first place. It remains to be seen what happens when both producers and consumers try to improve their situation by speculative actions.
The results of the game experiment are presented in three steps. First, there is only a game between buffer stock manager and producing countries and regions in which the consuming regions remain passive. This is called game 1. Second, there is only a game between buffer stock manager and consuming regions in which the producing countries and regions remain passive. This is called game 2. Finally, the game between the three market participants is called game 3. It is found that in the games with consuming regions there is more room for the buffer stock manager to operate in. In these games the value of Q~I can be increased to 35. In game 1 the preset boundary for the producing countries and regions is hit for Qii = 6, i = 2 ..... 9. In game 2 the preset boundary for the consuming regions is hit for QI~ = 10, i= 10 ..... 13. In game 3 the preset boundaries are hit for Qil = 5, i = 2 ..... 9 and QI~ = 9, i = 10 ..... 13. It is possible to vary the values of Qii over the different countries and regions and over time. One variation is to relate these values to the size of the trade of each country and region so that the resulting interventions will also be related to the size of the trade. It turns out that the market results remain essentially the same. The reason is that the interventions of the producers as a group and of the consumers as a group remain essentially the same. The results with these values for QI~ are presented in Table 8 for game 1, Table 9 for game 2 and Table 10 for game 3.
The first conclusion to be drawn from the figures in Tables 7-10 is that the pattern of the buffer stock interventions is the same in all four experiments. The buffer stock manager starts to sell for three periods, then buys for three periods, then sells again for four or five periods and ends up buying. In total the buffer stock manager is a seller. The producing countries or regions are predominantly withholding in order to lower supply to increase prices and the consuming regions are predominantly using up their stocks in order to lower demand to decrease prices, which is to be expected.
As an indicator of the degree of stabilization the sum of absolute differences between the values of the resulting price path and the corresponding values of the target price path is used. The optimal control However, the stabilization indices for the games with consumers are almost as good as for the optimal control solution, whereas the stabilization index for the game with only producers is quite a bit worse. This means that the destabilizing effect is mainly due to storage activities in the producing countries and regions. Net sales from the buffer stock are the lowest in the game with only consumers and the highest in the game with only producers. However, this does not mean that the buffer stock manager is less active in game 2. On the contrary, the sum of interventions in absolute terms is the highest in game 2 and the lowest in game 1. What this does imply is that the costs of replenishing the buffer stock up to the initial level of 100000 metric tons will be lower. These costs are calculated by multiplying the required quantity by a simulated world market price. In this simulation it is assumed that every market participant has to restore its initial endowment, which determines fictitious supply and demand, and that there are enough buyers or sellers. In order to get an indicator for the costs of operating the buffer stock the net inward cash flow into the buffer stock has to be subtracted from these replenishment costs. The costs of operating the buffer stock are the lowest for the game with producers only (game 1 ). The interventions of the producers induce an upward pressure on the world market price, which leads to a very high net inward cash flow into the buffer stock. These revenues outweigh the high replenishment costs for this game. The costs of operating the buffer stock are also very low for the game with producers and consumers (game 3). The interventions of producers and consumers almost cancel out so that the world market price path changes only slightly as compared to the price path in the optimal control solution. Therefore the net inward cash flow into the buffer stock is almost the same. However, the replenishment costs are much lower. The costs of operating the buffer stock for the game with consumers only (game 2) are higher than for the other two games but still lower than for the optimal control solution. The interventions of consumers induce a downward pressure on the world market price, which leads to a low net inward cash flow into the buffer stock. However, the replenishment costs are much lower, since a large buffer stock remains at the end, and this outweighs the lower revenues.
The results of game 1 and game 2 show that producers and consumers actually benefit from their actions. The pursuit of higher export prices and lower import prices leads to higher revenues and lower costs respectively. The group that remains passive has a loss. The differences between the gains of the one group and the losses of the other are due to the way in which the market is modelled when the market participants restore their initial endowments. The differences are a gain or a loss of fictitious traders. The results of game 3 show that when producers and consumers are both active the producers are worse off than in the optimal control solution. This is because the attempts of both groups to improve their situation approximately cancel out so that withholding and dumping implies a loss. On the other hand consumers are better off because they restore their used stocks at a favourable price. The values are, however, rather small. These budget considerations are important in putting the results in the right perspective. Although the general conclusion is that buffer stock stabilization activities are less successful when producing and consuming countries and regions also employ storage activities for their own sake, this conclusion is weakened by the fact that the operating costs of the buffer stock are much lower. Furthermore, the producers have lower revenues and the consumers have lower costs. A topic of further research will be to make an overall cost and benefit analysis and to see if the results are robust for reasonable variations in the target paths and the relative priorities. Finally, the issue of coordination through the buffer stock and conflict on the market afterwards could be analysed further with other non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic solution concepts.
Conclusion
This paper tries to answer the question of what happens if agents in producing and consuming countries are still strategically active on the international cocoa market, although countries coordinate their stabilizing efforts through a buffer stock manager. An empirical model for the world cocoa market is constructed and the optimal control solution for the buffer stock manager is compared with feedback Nash or subgame perfect game equilibria between buffer stock manager, producers and consumers. The conclusion is that the stabilizing efforts are partly offset by the strategic activities of the other market participants. However, the costs of operating the buffer stock decrease and some other market participants are better off. A further treatment of the trade off between the stabilization result, on the one hand, and costs and revenues, on the other hand, and the study of other game equilibria are left for further research.
